Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity by John E Sisko

Author:John E Sisko
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)
Published: 2018-05-28T16:00:00+00:00

Notes

1Williams 2006, p. 218 says, “I take hylomorphism to be the view that the relation of soul to body bears some illuminating resemblance to the relation of form to matter”. Keeping “hylomorphism” merely in reference to soul-body relations is too narrow. Soul-body relations are only a set of the possible form-matter relations, though they are clearly the most important and most characteristic, since for Aristotle among perishable, living beings, plants and animals are most strictly substantial beings (see esp. Metaphysics VII.16.1040b5–16).

2For Aristotle a “common” account intends to give a single account covering all the kinds generally on the same level, as all sorts of plants and animals are ensouled, and the common account of soul should apply similarly to all. In some contrast to this, a “universal” account covers things on quite different levels and may have to take account of wide differences. In De motu Aristotle seeks a common cause of all animal motion (1.698a4–5), whereas he also develops a universal reflection (1.698a11–14) upon the motion of the heavens and of non-living things in order to facilitate his account of animal motion.

3And though it is true that the soul as form is the form of the living composite being, Aristotle carefully defines the soul as the form of the matter at II.1.412a6–10.

4Organikon in II.1.412a28–b1 is here understood to mean “instrumental” rather than “organized” or composed of instruments or organs (cf. III.9.432b18). Aristotle is making the general point, consistent with his top-down approach to explanation, that the body of the living being is instrumental to its functioning and so used as an instrument by the living being’s soul.

5In generation, for Aristotle, parts can precede the entire living being since he has observed, probably with chicken eggs, that the heart emerges early and then leads to the development of the rest of the animal (see De juv. 3.468b28–469a2, and PA III.4.665a33–b2).

6In recent times we have the experience of resuscitation and transplantation of body parts to support this. Aristotle himself hypothetically entertains the possibility of an eye transplant (see DA I.1.408b18–31) and speaks of asexual reproduction of plants by divisions and the grafting of plant parts (see De juv. 3.468b16–28).

7Charles 2008 accuses most recent commentators of Aristotle of making Cartesian assumptions since they begin trying to relate the physical to the psychological. Charles instead assigns Aristotle a version of hylomorphism with formal and material components so inseparable they cannot even be known apart. Yet form and matter’s being one still allows the priority of form, distinct accounts, and some separability. In DA II.1 Aristotle gives accounts of soul involving form and matter, but in II.2.413b11–13 he offers a purely formal account of soul. There must be some separability of psychical function and body type inasmuch as different sorts of bodies in different kinds of animals support similar operations, e.g., nutrition, perception, and passions. See Caston 2008 for further critique of overly strong hylomorphism.

8The discussion of method in Posterior Analytics II.1 would lead us to expect the determination that the soul is prior to seeking what it is, but Aristotle does not quite go in this order in DA.

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